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JURIES AND DAMAGES: A COMMENTARY
Nancy S. Marder*
INTRODUCTION
When a jury awarded Stella Liebeck $2.7 million in punitive dam-
ages after she had suffered third-degree burns from a spilled cup of
McDonald's coffee,1 many members of the public and press deni-
grated the result,2 describing it as "outrageous" 3 and the jury as "run-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law School. B.A. 1980,
Yale University; M. Phil. 1982, Cambridge University; J.D. 1987, Yale University. I thank Geof-
frey Graber and Elisa Montoya for their research assistance.
1. See Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., No. CV 93-02419, 1995 WL 360309, at
*1 (D.N.M. Aug. 18, 1994).
2. See, e.g., A Case for Iced Coffee, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 1994, at A10 ("Iced coffee may not
be just for summer anymore, thanks to a jury in Albuquerque, N.M. Last week it awarded Stella
Liebeck, 81, $2.9 million in damages for burns she suffered after spilling a cup of McDonald's
coffee on herself."); Robert A. Clifford, Justice System Corrects Its Outrages, CHI. TRIB., Sept.
29, 1994, § 1, at 24 (describing the McDonald's case as "an example of the system gone berserk,"
but correcting itself with the judge's reduction of the punitive damages award); Maura Dolan,
Huge Jury Awards Seldom Live Up to Their Billing; Lawsuits: Plaintiffs Often Pocket Far Less,
Study Finds, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1996, at Al ("The scrutiny from appellate courts is often mild
compared to the disdain that huge awards generate among the public. The $2.9 million awarded
to an elderly woman who received severe burns after spilling McDonald's coffee in her lap be-
came fodder for tort reformers and talk show hosts."); Randy Harris, Letter to Editor, Litigation
Explosion, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1995, at B6 (describing McDonald's case as "infamous"); Has the
"Litigation Explosion" Blasted Away Common Sense?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1995, at B6 [herein-
after Litigation Explosion] ("There indeed are some excessive verdicts; the $2.7 million a New
Mexico jury awarded a woman who was scalded when she spilled a cup of McDonald's coffee on
her legs is the most recent egregious example."); Thomas Olson, Spilled Coffee and Leaky Valves
Spur Reform of Lawsuit Awards, PITTSBURGH Bus. TIMES & J., Apr. 10, 1995, available in 1995
WL 7907075 ("Probably the most celebrated-and ridiculed-punitive damage award in recent
years was the case involving the now infamous McDonald's coffee.").
3. See, e.g., Andrea Gerlin, A Matter of Degree: How a Jury Decided That a Coffee Spill Is
Worth $2.9 Million, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1994, at Al ("Public opinion is squarely on the side of
McDonald's. Polls have shown a large majority of Americans-including many who typically
support the little guy-to be outraged at the verdict."); Andrea Gerlin, How Jury Gave $2.9
Million for Coffee Spill McDonald's Callousness Was Real Issue, Jurors Say, in Case of Burned
Woman, Pr-rsntUROH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 4, 1994, at B2, available in 1994 WL 8232627 (same);
Olson, supra note 2, at 1995 WL 7907075 ("'Even if it was a truly outrageous result, our judicial
system can throw out outrageous results, as they did in the McDonald's case."' (quoting John
Gismondi, a plaintiffs' litigator with Gismondi & Margolis)); Aric Press, Are Lawyers Burning
America?, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 20, 1995, at 32, 35 ("The American Tort Reform Association bought
radio ads in the Washington area using the Liebeck case as its key example of an 'outrageous'
lawsuit."); John Taylor, Coffee Ruling Spurs Popeye's To Halt Sales, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD,
Sept. 8, 1994, available in 1994 WL 8593317 ("'I thought [the award] was outrageous."' (quoting
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:427
away. ' 4 What was often ignored in these accounts of the case was that
the eighty-one-year-old woman's injuries were very serious,5 that Mc-
Donald's had known about the problem of its exceptionally hot cof-
fee6 but had declined to warn consumers 7 or to change the
temperature at which it served its coffee, 8 and that the trial judge sub-
sequently reduced the $2.7 million punitive damage award to
$480,000.9
Sheila Liebeck's case, though involving punitive damages, illustrates
several problems with the way in which civil juries' damage awards in
general are covered in the press and perceived by the public. One
Pat Kelley, treasurer for Rigel Corp., which holds the franchise for 14 Kentucky Fried Chicken
restaurants and 66 Godfather's pizza restaurants)). See generally Olson, supra note 2, at 1995
WL 7907075 (" 'There are runaway damages and outrageous awards."' (quoting Chris Hague, a
partner at Meyer, Unkovic & Schott, who represents both plaintiffs and defendants in civil
cases)).
4. See, e.g., Chi Chi Sileo & David Cogan, Does Legal Debate Rely on Rhetoric Over Reason?,
INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, May 29, 1995, at 15 ("Advocates of legal reform immediately pointed to
the [Liebeck] award as yet another instance of runaway litigation, 'frivolous' lawsuits and vindic-
tive juries."). But see id. ("Far from being a symbol of runaway litigation, say opponents of legal
reform, the [Liebeck] case is an example of the civil-justice system working to protect ordinary
citizens."). See generally Stephen Budiansky, How Lawyers Abuse the Law, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Jan. 30, 1995, at 50, 52 ("Insurers and manufacturers have spent millions publiciz-
ing tales of runaway litigation, of outrageous multimillion-dollar punitive-damage awards ....
Much of it is exaggerated."); Alex Kozinski, The Case of Punitive Damages v. Democracy, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 19, 1995, at A18 ("While most juries will resist the pressure, it only takes a single
runaway jury to send shock waves through an entire industry.").
5. See S. Reed Morgan, A Slow Burn Over Fast Food; Don't Blame a Runaway Jury for a
Recent Verdict Against McDonald's, RECORDER, Sept. 30, 1994, at 8 ("To critics of the original
jury awards, the case is an example of runaway juries .... The facts, of course, point in an
entirely different direction .... Third-degree burns do not heal without skin grafting, debride-
ment and whirlpool treatments ....").
6. See id. ("McDonald's admitted that it has known about the risk of serious burns from its
scalding hot coffee for more than 10 years."); see also Nicolle Bratkovics, Restaurant Adviser
Assists in Coffee Spill Verdict, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 22, 1994, at 1 ("Evidence at trial
indicated that McDonald's coffee is served at 180-190 degrees, and was at least 165-170 degrees
when it was spilled. In contrast,.. . . coffee brewed at home is generally 135-140 degrees.");
Richard Grossman, Editorial, As a Matter of Law: Punitive Damages Serve a Purpose, PosT-
STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Sept. 12, 1994, available in 1994 WL 5600240 ("Post-verdict reports
in the McDonald's case indicate that they deliberately make their coffee unreasonably hot.").
7. See Morgan, supra note 5, at 8 ("McDonald's admitted that it did not warn customers of the
nature and extent of this risk and could offer no explanation as to why it did not.").
8. See id. ("McDonald's witnesses testified that it did not inten[d] to turn down the heat. As
one witness put it: 'No, there is no current plan to change the procedure that we're using in that
regard right now."').
9. See, e.g., Clifford, supra note 2, § 1, at 24 (noting that "studies support the conclusion that
the judicial system inevitably corrects what the public deems to be outrageous .... [G]enerally
only 11.2% of the punitive damages awards are collected after appeal."); Dolan, supra note 2, at
Al ("Unbeknown to most, the award was reduced by a court and settled for less than $640,000
[including compensatory damages]."); Litigation Explosion, supra note 2, at B6 ("In the McDon-
ald's case, the judge cut the punitive award to $480,000; jury awards in other cases are quite
often reduced significantly after trial as a result of appellate court action or settlement.").
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problem is that awards that are dramatic are the ones that receive
press attention. The more mundane, less sensational damage awards
that are decided by juries everyday are often overlooked. One conse-
quence of such coverage is that jury verdicts appear to be more incon-
sistent than they actually are. Another problem is that the damage
awards that are described in the press are not the ones that are neces-
sarily received. A jury's award does not mark the end of the process;
the verdict must still be reviewed by the judge. This means that both
press and public may be judging damage awards prematurely, before
judges have reviewed them.
Neil Vidmar, in a study of pain and suffering awards,10 and Shari
Diamond, in a study of damage awards," provide empirical evidence
that challenges the popular view of "runaway" juries reaching "outra-
geous" verdicts. Vidmar, from his analysis of data found in verdict
reporters from three states,' 2 concluded that juries are not running
wild in their award of damages for pain and suffering in medical mal-
practice suits; rather, they are reaching consistent awards, which are
not as high as the press accounts suggest because they are often re-
duced by trial judges in the post-verdict period.13 Diamond, using
jury-eligible citizens who engaged in deliberations, found that there is
variability in pain and suffering awards, but that the variability is re-
duced by using juries rather than individual decisionmakers and could
be further reduced by giving juries guideposts.14
I. VIDMAR'S STUDY
A. Background
Vidmar, after reviewing the literature on pain and suffering awards,
noted that a common problem for researchers is how to determine
how much of a jury's award is attributable to economic losses and how
much is attributable to pain and suffering because the jury is usually
not required to specify. In one method, "the subtrahend method,"
researchers subtract the economic losses from the total verdict; the
remainder is attributed to non-economic losses, such as pain and suf-
fering.' 5 This method, however, is inexact. To address this problem,
10. Neil Vidmar et al., Jury Awards for Medical Malpractice and Post-Verdict Adjustments of
Those Awards, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 265 (1999).
11. Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments About Liability and Damages: Sources of
Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301 (1999).
12. Vidmar looked at commercial verdict reporters from California, Florida, and New York.
13. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
14. Diamond et al., supra note 11, at 318.
15. Vidmar et al., supra note 10, at 270-72.
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Vidmar looked at jurisdictions that require the jury to specify dam-
ages for each element of the award. California, Florida, and New
York require the juries to separate economic from non-economic
awards.16 Therefore, Vidmar turned to the commercial verdict report-
ers for each of these states and examined medical malpractice verdicts
during the years 1985-1997.
Among his results, Vidmar found that the awards increased with
severity of injury, except when death occurred;1 7 that the non-eco-
nomic component of the award was between 50 to 60% percent of the
total award;18 and that the post-verdict awards that plaintiffs received
were lower than the initial jury awards.1 9 In New York, approxi-
mately 44% of awards were adjusted, mostly downward, by the judge
in the post-verdict phase, while in Florida and in California the reduc-
tions were less dramatic. 20
B. Additional Questions
Vidmar has uncovered a useful source of data in the commercial
verdict reporters, but they raise additional questions. Although Vid-
mar recognized that these sources have their limitations and should
not be taken at face value,2' he does not explore as fully as possible
some of the questions that data from these reporters raise.
1. Geography
One question, for example, is whether there is a geographical effect
of which Vidmar should be aware in limiting his data sets to Califor-
16. See CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 625 (West Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.042 (West
1997); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4111(d) (McKinney Supp. 1998).
17. Vidmar et al., supra note 10, at 294 (California); id. at 291 (Florida); id. at 284 (New York);
id. at 296 ("Awards increased with injury severity, except that there was a sharp decrease when
death occurred.").
18. Id. at 296 ("In all three states, the percentage of the total, unadjusted damage awards
exceeded 50%, on average, for all cases .... "); id. (finding that the percentage of the award for
non-economic damages was 60% in California); id. at 292 (finding that the proportion of the
award for non-economic damages was 54% in Florida); id. at 285 (finding that the percentage of
the award for non-economic damages was 58% in New York).
19. Id. at 295 (noting that in California, the median and mean verdict awards were reduced by
about 10% through post-verdict adjustment); id. at 292 (observing that in Florida, post-verdict
awards were lower than jury awards, but noting that the adjustments were "substantially
smaller" in Florida than in New York); id. at 286 ("[T]he mean payment to the plaintiff was
approximately 62% of the jury verdict[ ]" based on the New York data.).
20. Id. at 298 (providing summary).
21. See id. at 267 ("[T]hese data sets present a number of methodological problems .... "); id.
at 281 (noting that the data sets are not comprehensive and selection may not have been ran-
dom); id. at 295 (recognizing there may be differences in the litigation patterns of the three states
and the way in which the data in the reporters were compiled).
[Vol. 48:427
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nia, New York, and Florida. Are these states representative in their
litigation patterns and legal cultures? Or are there some special char-
acteristics (They are on the coasts? They are populous states? They
have large immigrant populations?22) that should limit any conclu-
sions drawn from data from these three states? Do awards from these
states tend to be higher or lower than those from other states? It
would be useful for Vidmar to explain why he thinks his data, though
limited to these three states, can tell us something useful about pain
and suffering awards that is applicable beyond these states.
Another question raised by geography is whether there are any
county patterns that Vidmar can discern from these reporters. All
three verdict reporters identify in which county the case was heard.
The reason this information could prove useful is that in criminal
cases there has been considerable debate about whether juries in
some counties are acquitting criminal defendants at higher rates than
the rest of the country. The so-called "Bronx jury," drawn largely
from a community of minority jurors, has been characterized as ac-
quitting, whether based on reasonable doubt or nullification, at higher
rates than juries in other geographical areas.23 Are Bronx juries act-
ing differently in medical malpractice cases than juries in other coun-
ties? Or, is the Bronx jury effect, to the extent it exists, limited to
criminal cases? A county-by-county analysis of damage awards might
reveal a Bronx jury effect, not only in the Bronx but in other counties
as well. This effect would be important to identify because it might be
22. See, e.g., Deborah Sontag & Celia W. Dugger, The New Immigrant Tide: A Shuttle Be-
tween Worlds, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1998, at Al (describing New York as "the American city with
the largest and most diverse population of immigrants, living side by side in neighborhoods
where the very fact of their double identity [with their new home and their homeland] is a
bond"); id. at A12 ("So fluid is the exchange between the homeland and New York that it alters
both places. People move back and forth, money moves back and forth, ideas move back and
forth.").
23. There is debate about whether Bronx juries, and juries in other largely urban, minority
areas, are acquitting at an unusually high rate. According to one writer, Bronx juries are not
acquitting at unusually high rates, but are acquitting merely at the high end of the norm. See
Roger Parloff, Race and Juries: If It Ain't Broke, A.B.A. J., June 1997, at 5, 6 (concluding that the
acquittal rate for jury trials in the Bronx of black defendants charged with felonies was 43.6% in
1995 and 39.1% in 1996). But see Bejamin A. Holden et al., Racism on Trial, MONTREAL GA-
ZETTE, Oct. 7, 1995, Weekly Review, at B1 (claiming that in the Bronx, "black defendants are
acquitted in felony cases 47.6% of the time-nearly three times the national acquittal rate of
17% for all races"). Parloff, while challenging others' figures of Bronx acquittal rates as "nearly
triple" those of the national average, acknowledged that the figures he offered indicate that the
rates of acquittals in the Bronx "are high for state courts in New York, and probably for state
courts nationwide." Parloff, supra, at 6. From the interviews he conducted with Bronx judges,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys, however, he concluded that these juries are likely to be ac-
quitting, not because of nullification, but because of greater juror skepticism of police testimony.
See id. at 7.
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that once these. outlier counties are excluded the damage award re-
sults are even more consistent than Vidmar has found.
2. Selection Criteria
Other questions raised by Vidmar's use of data from the verdict
reporters are how are cases selected for inclusion in the reporters and
what difference might this make? All of the reporters Vidmar relied
on are commercial and may have different selection criteria as to
which cases they include. Vidmar acknowledged this problem: "The
data sets are not comprehensive of all cases, and there is evidence that
the selection may not be random. ' 24 He described the New York Jury
Verdict Reporter, his source for the New York data, as containing "ap-
proximately 90% of all personal injury verdicts in Metropolitan New
York and surrounding counties, '2 5 whereas his Florida source, the
Florida Jury Verdict Reporter, is neither random nor comprehensive;
rather judges and law clerks decide which cases to forward for publi-
cation.26 With respect to the California Jury Verdict Reporter, Vidmar
did not say how selection is decided. Vidmar acknowledged a differ-
ence in approaches (except for California), but then proceeded to
treat all the data the same, selection differences notwithstanding.
From my own experience as a law clerk,27 I have seen that the deci-
sion whether to submit an opinion for publication is made quite care-
fully. At the district court level, we usually submitted an opinion for
publication if we thought it made a contribution to the law. The rea-
soning was similar at the court of appeals level, much to the conster-
nation of the Supreme Court, which has responded to this growing
trend toward unpublished appellate opinions28 by occasionally decid-
ing to hear such cases.29 If an opinion simply applied the law of the
circuit to the facts of the case, then the opinion became a memoran-
24. Vidmar et al., supra note 10, at 281.
25. Id. at 282.
26. Id. at 290.
27. I had the good fortune to clerk for Judge Leonard B. Sand in the Southern District of New
York in 1988-89, for Judge William A. Norris on the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
1989-90, and for Justice John Paul Stevens at the United States Supreme Court in 1990-92.
28. See, e.g., William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New
Certiorari. Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 282 (1996) ("[Ilt
is hardly surprising that published opinions today account for less than a third of federal circuit
terminations. The decline in publication is unfortunate because the traditional, fully reasoned
written opinion serves a number of vital functions.") (footnotes omitted).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 425 n.3 (1993) ("We deem
it remarkable and unusual that although the Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment that an Act
of Congress was unconstitutional as applied, the court found it appropriate to announce its judg-
ment in an unpublished per curiam opinion.").
[Vol. 48:427
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dum decision, which was unpublished 30 and could not; be cited as pre-
cedent.31 Thus, there may be a significant difference in the mix of
cases contained in the various reporters when one reporter includes
almost all cases that are decided in a jurisdiction, whereas another
leaves the decision to the discretion of judges and law clerks, who may
be highly selective.
3. Subject Matter
Vidmar also chose to focus on medical malpractice cases and this
decision raises the question whether the results would be different in
other kinds of cases. In an earlier study, Vidmar had concluded that
there is no support for the assertion that jurors treat medical malprac-
tice and auto negligence cases differently. 32 He also intends in the
future to extend the scope of cases by conducting additional studies in
which he would look at product liability and automobile negligence
torts cases.33 One question then is whether there is anything special
about medical malpractice cases that might lead to results that are
only applicable to medical malpractice cases. Another question is the
role that insurance plays. The verdict reporters indicate whether or
not the parties had insurance.34 It would be interesting to know
whether pain and suffering awards increased or decreased based on
who had insurance. In federal court,35 and in some state courts, in-
cluding California 36 and New York,37 the jury is not allowed to know
30. See 21 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 359-78, Rule 36-1 (1998) (Opinions, Memoranda,
Orders; Publication).
31. See id. at 359-79, Rule 36-3 ("Any disposition that is not an opinion or an order designated
for publication under Circuit Rule 36-5 shall not be regarded as precedent .... ).
32. Neil Vidmar et al., Damage Awards and Jurors' Responsibility Ascriptions in Medical Ver-
sus Automobile Negligence Cases, 12 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 149, 157-59 (1994).
33. Vidmar et al., supra note 10, at 267.
34. See, e.g., Anguiano-Delpino v. Sanchez, 3 TRIALS DIGEST 3D 154, available in 1997 WL
852659, at *5-6 ("The insurance carrier was Norcal Mutual Insurance Company for defendant
John Sanchez and The Doctors Company for defendant John Petraglia.").
35. See FED. R. EVID. 411 ("Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is
not admissible upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully.").
36. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1155 (West 1997) ("Evidence that a person was, at the time a
harm was suffered by another, insured wholly or partially against loss arising from liability for
that harm is inadmissible to prove negligence or other wrongdoing."). In civil trials in Califor-
nia, the court may instruct the jurors as follows: "There is no evidence before you that the
defendant has or does not have insurance for the plaintiff's claim. Whether such insurance exists
has no bearing upon any issue in this case. You must not discuss or consider it for any purpose."
CALIFORNIA BOOK OF APPROVED JURY INSTRuCTIONS (BAJI) § 1.04 (8th ed. 1986).
37. See, e.g., Constable v. Matie, 608 N.Y.S.2d 10, 11 (App. Div. 1993) (holding that a new
trial was required because evidence of insurance should not have been admitted); Griffen v.
Corporation of the Church of the Assumption of Mechanicville, 218 N.Y.S.2d 141, 142 (App.
Div. 1961) (holding that "the persistent insinuation by plaintiff's counsel before the jury of the
liability insurance coverage of the appellant church was prejudicial" and therefore reversing the
1998] 433
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whether the parties have insurance. In other states, such as Florida, 38
the jury is allowed to know about insurance, but not about policy lim-
its. 39 Yet, because this information is reported in the verdict reporter,
a researcher could nevertheless determine whether there are any cor-
relations between insurance coverage and pain and suffering awards.
By focusing on medical malpractice cases, Vidmar also has the op-
portunity to examine the ways that gender might influence pain and
suffering awards. The verdict reporters include the names of the par-
ties, which are usually (though not always) sufficient to ascertain gen-
der, and at least one reporter explicitly indicates the gender of the
plaintiff.40 It would be interesting to know if female plaintiffs receive
higher or lower damage awards in these medical malpractice cases.
Within the medical practice, there have certainly been indications of
gender bias, with studies showing that doctors have taken women's
complaints of pain less seriously than those of men;41 that women re-
ceive less aggressive medical treatment, particularly with respect to
heart attacks, than do men;4 2 and that medical research has been lim-
ited to all-male studies in the past, with the results simply assumed to
judgment and ordering a new trial); Note, Admissibility in New York of Evidence Alluding to the
Fact that the Defendant is Insured, 14 Sr. JOHN'S L. REV. 319, 319 (1940) ("As a general rule,
evidence in a negligence action that the defendant is insured against liability is inadmissible.").
38. Florida's rule, FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.450(e), which required that medical malpractice actions be
conducted without any reference to insurance or the joinder of an insurer as a co-defendant, was
deleted in 1984.
39. See Stecher v, Pomeroy, 244 So. 2d 488, 490 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that "while
it was error for the trial court to permit evidence as to the amount of insurance coverage, such
error was harmless").
40. The verdict reporter in Florida provided plaintiff's sex as part of plaintiff's information.
See, e.g., 98 Florida Jury Verdict Reporter 2-19, available in 1997 WL 862879.
41. See, e.g., Lee A. Green & Mack T. Ruffin, Differences in Management of Suspected Myo-
cardial Infarction in Men and Women, 36 J. FAM. PRAC. 389, 392 (1993) ("'If men are more likely
to have [myocardial infarctions], then men with chest pain are more likely to have heart disease
than women with chest pain' is not a valid inference, although it would appear to be one that
physicians in this study group made, whether consciously or not.").
42. See, e.g., Chelmer L. Barrow, Jr. & Kirk A. Easley, The Role of Gender and Race on the
Time Delay for Emergency Department Patients Complaining of Chest Pain to be Evaluated by a
Physician, 15 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 267, 276 (1996) ("[F]emales have been determined to
receive less aggressive treatment of coronary artery disease than their male counterparts, despite
the fact that women may experience a higher mortality rate from heart disease.") (footnote
omitted); Green & Ruffin, supra note 41, at 389 ("Women appear to receive not only less inten-
sive invasive treatment for ischemic heart disease than men, as previous studies have shown, but
also less aggressive noninvasive treatment."); Leslee J. Shaw et al., Gender Differences in the
Noninvasive Evaluation and Management of Patients with Suspected Coronary Artery Disease,
120 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 559, 564 (1994) ("Our study of 840 patients showed a relative
likelihood for further diagnostic testing in men that was approximately two times greater than
that observed in women."); Lawrence K. Altman, Study Finds Heart Treatment Differs for Men
and Women, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1991, at A18 ("Men are twice as likely as women to receive
newer life-saving treatments for heart attacks, a study ... has found.").
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be the same for women.43 My own hypothesis is that there would be a
gender difference, but it must remain a hypothesis until Vidmar or
others provide the empirical data to support or refute it.44
4. Supplementary Interviews
Although Vidmar points out that his analysis of the data in the ver-
dict reporters will not tell us whether the jury reached a reasonable
damage award,45 supplementary interviews with jurors and judges
might begin to answer that question.
It would be possible to do a sampling of follow-up interviews with
jurors and judges. Follow-up interviews with jurors would provide
some information as to their reasoning: How did they go about deter-
mining pain and suffering awards? What were they trying to achieve?
Although the verdict reporters do not provide the jurors' names, this
information is a matter of public record and would be available at the
courthouses where the trials took place.
Similarly, a sampling of follow-up interviews with judges might also
yield useful information. The verdict reporters provide the names of
the presiding judges, so some of these judges could be interviewed or
sent a questionnaire. It would be useful to know the judges' ration-
ales: When do judges adjust damage awards upward or downward and
why? Are they consistent in their treatment of pain and suffering
awards? There are a variety of procedural mechanisms that allow the
43. See, e.g., Mary Anne Bobinski, Women and HIV: A Gender-Based Analysis of a Disease
and Its Legal Regulation, 3 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 7, 15 (1994) (providing reasons often given to
justify the exclusion of women from medical research trials, including the effects of their hormo-
nal cycles and the possibility of pregnancy); id. at 16 (describing how the medical definition of
AIDS was based on studies of gay men, with the assumption that women would be affected in
the same way, but women did not suffer Kaposi's Sarcoma as did gay men, and they did experi-
ence a range of reproductive system effects, which the men did not); Denise Grady, Study Says
H.IV. Tests Misstate Women's Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1998, at A18 ("Women infected with
H.I.V. may be at a more advanced stage of infection and at a higher risk of developing AIDS
than men with identical results on certain blood tests .... ); id. ("The researchers suggest that
official treatment guidelines, used for both sexes even though they are based on research only in
men, should be changed to recommend earlier treatment for women."); Altman, supra note 42,
at A18 ("One possible explanation [for men being twice as likely as women to receive more life-
saving treatments for heart attacks] is that the initial studies proving the value of the treatments
were carried out chiefly in men.").
44. See, e.g., Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform: Gender Injustice in
Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1, 82 (1995) ("Medical malpractice awards to the women in our
sample were almost three times more likely to include a pain and suffering component as those
given to men. This finding is consistent with past research showing the male victims receive less
in non-economic damages than female victims.").
45. See Vidmar et al., supra note 10, at 281 ("Additionally, we cannot stress too strongly the




judge to adjust the jury's damage award. The trial judge could de-
crease or increase the award through judicial remittitur46 or additur47
respectively. Or, the trial judge might have to reduce the award be-
cause it exceeded a statutory cap established by the state legislature.48
In addition, the appellate court could reduce the award were the los-
ing party to appeal. Other reasons that an award might be adjusted
after the verdict would be that the parties reached a settlement prior
to appeal or the defendant had no collectible assets or insurance with
which to satisfy the award.
Of course, this would not be the first time that researchers have
looked to judges to try to provide a benchmark for evaluating jury
decisions. This was, after all, the approach taken by Professors Harry
Kalven and Hans Zeisel in their landmark study of the jury, The
American Jury.49 They compared jury verdicts with judges' assess-
ments of those verdicts, and concluded that judges and juries agreed
about 75% of the time;5° when they disagreed, it was over the evi-
dence or in the grey areas, in which judges believed that juries had
more discretion to act in accordance with community values, even if
those decisions were sometimes contrary to the law.51 Although this
approach of contrasting judge and jury decisions has a serious meth-
odological flaw, in that there is no reason to use judges as a bench-
mark and to believe that they have the right answer any more than the
jury does, at the very least this information would provide an addi-
tional data point. Admittedly, even if the judge agreed with the jury's
award, that would not mean that the jury had reached the right
number. Rather, all that it would mean is that judge and jury were at
least consistent with each other. And since consistency in damage
awards is something that Vidmar is interested in examining, judge in-
terviews or questionnaires that supplement the verdict reporters
might help in this respect.
46. Remittitur, "[tihe power to reduce damages," is recognized "by virtually all judicial sys-
tems." JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.4, at 560 (2d ed. 1993).
47. Additur, which is "the power to increase damages.., has not been accepted in all courts,"
id., largely because it did not exist under common law, leading the Supreme Court to hold in
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935), that additur violated the Seventh Amendment. Id. How-
ever, some state courts have upheld its constitutionality under state law. See FRIEDENTHAL ET
AL., supra note 46, at 561.
48. See Koenig & Rustad, supra note 44, at 79 ("Twenty-one states have enacted some reform
measure limiting non-economic damages in health care litigation. . . . [TIort reformers have
succeeded in capping non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases in several states.")
(footnote omitted). Among states that have passed statutes limiting pain and suffering awards in
medical malpractice suits are Michigan, Wisconsin, and Utah. See id. n.331.
49. HARRY KALVEN JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
50. Id. at 56.




One of Vidmar's conclusions is that a jury;s damage award, includ-
ing the amount it provides for pain and suffering, is often subject to
adjustment during the post-verdict period, and this goes unrecog-
nized.52 One of the challenges, then, is how to educate the press and
public as to the interim nature of the jury's damage award. The goal
should be to encourage the press to focus its reporting on the damage
award ultimately approved by the judge rather than on the initial
award reached by the jury.
The reason this shift in focus from damage award to adjusted award
is so important is that the press and public will continue to have a
skewed vision of juries and their damage awards. They will continue
to believe that the awards are too high and that the jury is at fault
when, in fact, neither is true. These misperceptions could be corrected
if the press and public knew that the awards are often reduced and
that the jury is not the only actor in the decisionmaking process.
Although Vidmar is cautious about proposing ways to do this, perhaps
because he is a social scientist with a healthy respect for the limita-
tions of any one empirical study, I, as a law professor, am less con-
strained and am willing to speculate on possible reforms.
1. Delay Damages Announcement
One way to shift public focus from the jury's damage award to the
judge's adjusted award is to delay the release of the jury's damage
award until the judge has made the appropriate adjustments, and then
have both awards announced at the same time. The delay would al-
low the public to learn about the jury's award, not in isolation as it
currently does, but as part of the judicial process, in which the judge
also has a role to play.
Under the current system, in which the jury award is announced to
great fanfare and publicity, by the time the judge adjusts the award,
assuming adjustments are required, both press and public have lost
interest in the case and the judge's action receives little public notice.
After all, it is far more dramatic to hear about a $2.7 million punitive
damage award than it is to hear about an award of $480,000 some time
later when the facts of the case have already begun to fade. 53
The delay in the announcement of the jury's damage award might
require changes in the judge's instructions and the juror's oath. To
52. Vidmar et al., supra note 10, at 298-99.
53. See Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., No. CV 93-02419, 1995 WL 360309,
at *1 (D.N.M. Aug. 18, 1994).
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ensure that the jury's damage award is not announced until the judge
has made any necessary adjustments might require the jurors to swear
to maintain silence and the judge to instruct the jurors that they are
not to disclose this information until the judge has acted on the
award.54 Requiring the jurors to keep silent on a matter, if only for a
limited period of time, is not unprecedented. Grand jurors must
swear to maintain the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings and not
reveal what takes place in the proceedings or in the juryroom to those
outside.55 At least federal courts in two states, Connecticut and Loui-
siana, prohibit petit jurors from revealing to outsiders what occurred
during their deliberations 56 and at least one court did the same in a
recent high-profile case. 57 In other federal courts, judges instruct ju-
rors at the close of the trial that they are free to talk to others, but
they are not required to talk to anybody.58
2. Educate Public About Damage Awards
An alternative is for the court to emphasize to the press and public
that the jury's damage award is an "interim" award. The judge could
make this point in open court at the time when the jury announces its
damage award, and it would be reflected in the public record. Every
54. See generally Nancy S. Marder, Deliberations and Disclosures: A Study of Post-Verdict In-
terviews of Jurors, 82 IowA L. REV. 465, 541-44, 546 (1997) (suggesting that courts, using the
juror's oath and the judge's instruction, impose some limitations on a juror's disclosures of jury
deliberations, if only for a limited amount of time, to preserve the integrity of the jury's verdict).
55. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2) ("A grand juror ... shall not disclose matters occurring
before the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules.... A knowing violation of
Rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of court.").
56. See CONN. FED. Loc. Cr. R. 12(e)(1) ("No juror shall respond to any inquiry as to the
deliberations or vote of the jury or of any other individual juror, except on leave of Court .... ")
(emphasis added); LA. FED. Loc. CT. R. 47.5E(c)(2) and 47.5M & W(c)(2) ("No juror who may
consent to be interviewed shall disclose any information with respect to ... the deliberations of
the jury."). See generally Abraham S. Goldstein, Jury Secrecy and the Media: The Problem of
Postverdict Interviews, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 295, 310 (recommending a statute "making it a crime
for anyone without court permission to seek information from jurors about their deliberations,
or for jurors to provide such information").
57. See United States v. Cleveland, No. 96-207 Section "R," 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10718, at
*1, *4 (E.D. La. July 22, 1997) (instructing jurors in a high-profile criminal case that "absent a
special order by [the judge], no juror may be interviewed by anyone concerning the deliberations
of the jury"), aff d, 128 F.3d 267, 270 (5th Cir. 1997) ("A juror in this case ... is only prevented
from being interviewed about the private debates and discussions which took place in the jury
room during the time leading up to the jury's rendering of its verdict.").
58. See, e.g., KAN. FED. Loc. CT. R. 123 (a)(9) ("No juror has any obligation to speak to any
person about any case and may refuse all interviews or comments."); OKLA. FED. Loc. CT. R.
47.2 ("Upon discharge from service, each juror is free to discuss, or refuse to discuss, said juror's
service with any person if the juror so desires."); Wyo. FED. Loc. CT. R. 309(b) ("No juror has
any obligation to speak to any person about any case and may refuse all interviews and
comments.").
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time the judge refers to the award, he or she could preface it with the
word "interim." This would serve to remind those in the courtroom
that the jury's damage award is subject to revision by the judge, and
should be viewed as only the first step in the process of determining
an appropriate figure. The hope would be that when the press reports
on the jury's damage award it would note that the award is only an
interim figure, and that the final figure would be determined by the
judge. It would also be the press's responsibility to report on the dam-
age award after it has been adjusted by the judge.
3. Encourage Early Judicial Involvement
Another approach would be to involve the judge early in the proc-
ess of determining the damage award rather than waiting until after
the jury has reached its determination. This proposal connects Neil
Vidmar's research with that of Shari Diamond.59 Diamond suggested
that the judge provide guidelines to the jury in setting damage awards.
Diamond's proposal also has support from Vidmar's study. Whatever
guidelines the judge uses to adjust a jury's damage award in the post-
verdict period, the judge could also share with the jury in the pre-
verdict period. The judge could provide the jury with whatever guide-
lines, range, or past comparable cases the judge would draw from to
decide what the appropriate damage award should be and simply
share this information with the jury before, rather than after, the jury
reaches its damage award.
4. Expand the Judicial Role
An even more radical reform would be to limit the jury to a liability
finding and leave the damage award completely in the hands of the
judge. Even today, trials are often bifurcated, with the jury determin-
ing liability, and if there is a finding of liability, then the trial enters
the damages phase and the jury determines damages. Although Vid-
mar does not suggest allowing the judge to make the damages deter-
mination, certainly others have.60 To advocate such a proposal,
however, one would have to have a great deal of faith in judges and a
lot of skepticism about juries.
59. See infra Part II.
60. See generally Development in the Law-The Jury's Capacity to Decide Complex Civil Cases,
110 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1498 (1997) ("[Jludges can bifurcate tort trials so that jurors can con-




Objections to the above proposals are likely to come from several
different fronts. Judges, attorneys, and members of the press are all
likely to want to preserve the status quo.
Judges will resist the suggestion that they become more actively in-
volved in determining damages at an earlier stage in the proceedings.
They are likely to explain that decisions about damages are properly
left to the jury to decide in the first instance. Similarly, they are un-
likely to want to replace the jury in deciding a damage award because
it is a difficult determination to make and one for which little guidance
exists and for which the judge does not have any particular expertise
or training. In general, judges are likely to be wary about intruding
upon decisions, that they believe are properly within the province of
the jury.
Attorneys are also likely to resist greater judicial involvement in
determining damage awards. They want the highest possible damage
award, and are unlikely to want to give up what they perceive as the
potential for a windfall award from the jury. Even if a judge's involve-
ment in determining damages means less risk for the attorney, it also
means a reduced chance of a windfall. Attorneys are also likely to
disfavor juror silence until the judge has adjusted the jury's verdict
because then the attorney's victory will seem less pronounced and the
award less likely to attract public attention.
Members of the press would undoubtedly object to the proposal
that jury damage awards not be announced until the post-verdict
phase when the judge has had the opportunity to make any necessary
adjustments. The press could point to the First Amendment 6' and ar-
gue that the trial is open to the public, that the damage award that is
reached by the jury is public information, and that the jurors need to
be held accountable for their decisions. In addition, the press could
point to the jurors' First Amendment right to speak to the press, if
they so choose. The press's desire to focus on the jury's award rather
than the judge-modified award is because the jury's award is likely to
be higher and more sensational; it will sell more newspapers. It is not
surprising that Stella Liebeck was portrayed in the press as a plaintiff
who brought a frivolous lawsuit and was rewarded with an exorbitant
amount of money by a jury system gone awry. Such a story is likely to
have popular appeal, whereas a careful examination of the facts and
arguments does not have the same appeal.
61. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press .... ").
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The press is also unlikely to be persuaded that, because the judge
describes the jury's damage award as "interim," it should adopt that
convention as well. Again, the press is likely to take refuge in the
First Amendment: It will decide how to describe a jury award and will
resist deferring to the court's description. Moreover, there are some
legal procedures that the press continues to describe incorrectly, and
this may be one of those procedures. For example, when the United
States Supreme Court denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, it is not
upholding a lower court decision;62 rather, it is simply exercising its
discretion 63 and declining to accept the case for review.64 The press
continues to describe the Court's action incorrectly. Just as it may
make for a better story to describe the Court as having taken some
point of view on the lower court case, so too, it may make for a better
story if the jury's damage award is seen as final rather than as an in-
terim award in an extended process.
E. A Recommendation
My recommendation is that the jury's damage award should not be
disclosed until the judge's adjustments can also be announced. It
seems unlikely that there would be a First Amendment problem be-
cause the jury's damage award would only be delayed, not perma-
nently concealed. Courts have said that the First Amendment is not
absolute and is subject to time, place, and manner restrictions. 65 This
would simply be a time restriction.
62. See, e.g., Affirmative Action; Ban may be Legal but Isn't Wise, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis),
Nov. 5, 1997, at 22A (describing the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari as "uph[olding] one
state's ban on affirmative action"); Stiart J. Davis, Letter to Editor, High Court Has Upheld 2d
Amendment Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1993 (describing the Supreme Court's denial of certio-
rari in Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 464 U.S. 863 (1983), as "uph[olding] without comment
a United States Court of Appeals decision").
63. See Sup. CT. R. 10 ("Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial
discretion.").
64. "Inasmuch, therefore, as all that a denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari means is that
fewer than four members of the Court thought it should be granted, this Court has rigorously
insisted that such a denial carries with it no implication whatever regarding the Court's views on
the merits of a case which it has declined to review." Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc.,
338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., opinion respecting the denial of the petition for writ of
certiorari).
65. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966) (upholding as constitutional the
trespass conviction of demonstrators who gathered in front of a jail to protest its segregation of
inmates and who refused to disperse after warnings by the sheriff); Poulos v. New Hampshire,
345 U.S. 395, 414 (1953) (upholding as constitutional a state law requiring a license to hold
religious services in a public park); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITIONAL
LAW § 16.46, at 1139-40 (5th ed. 1995).
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I do not have much faith in judges being able to modify the press's
descriptions simply by using the word "interim" to describe a jury's
damage award. If the Supreme Court cannot persuade the press to
describe certiorari accurately, then it seems equally unlikely that
courts will be able to persuade the press to describe a jury's damage
award as interim.
Although I certainly do not support the proposal that judges take
over the role of determining damage awards, I do think there is merit
in having judges more involved in the determination at an earlier
stage. One reason judges should not be deciding damages is that these
are decisions for which there is no right answer, and so it seems appro-
priate to turn to a jury to obtain a community sense of what an appro-
priate amount might be. To explore further the guidance that judges
might provide to juries without usurping their proper role, I turn to
Shari Diamond's research and the role she described for judges and
juries in the assessment of damage awards.
II. DIAMOND'S STUDY
A. Background
Diamond, like Vidmar, investigated damage awards, but used a dif-
ferent method for her inquiry. She showed jury-eligible citizens a
videotape of a products liability case.66 Before the mock jurors
viewed one of six versions of the videotape, they completed a ques-
tionnaire in which they provided certain demographic and back-
ground information.67 Immediately after the viewing, each juror
completed another questionnaire, indicating how he or she would
have decided the case. The mock jurors were then assigned to six-
person juries, where they deliberated and reached a verdict. 68
Among her results, Diamond found that while background charac-
teristics showed only a "modest association" 69 with verdict prefer-
ences, certain attitudinal variables were associated with verdict
66. The case involved plaintiff Boyd suing American Beryllium Corporation ("ABC") for
damages based on Boyd's claim that he had suffered lung damage after exposure to a product
manufactured by ABC during his work as a plasterer for ABC. See Diamond et al., supra note
11, at 303.
67. Id. at 304-05.
68. Id. at 305.
69. Id. at 306-07.
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preferences. 70 Nine attitudinal variables enabled the researchers to
predict 67% of the individual jurors' liability decisions.71
With respect to damages, however, there was less predictability.
This was the case for pain and suffering awards in particular, for which
jurors receive little guidance, rather than for economic losses, for
which jurors hear much testimony. 72 Although there was greater vari-
ability in damage awards than there was for liability, Diamond noted
that there was slightly less variability for juries' damage awards than
there was for individual jurors' damage awards.73 These results led
Diamond to two conclusions: that it may be preferable to return to
twelve-person juries rather than the current six- or eight-person juries,
and that it may be useful for courts to provide jurors with guideposts
for determining damages. 74
B. Observations on Methodology
Before pursuing Diamond's conclusions, several observations on
her method are in order. The first is that by using jury-eligible citizens
rather than students, Diamond avoided one of the pitfalls of many
jury researchers. Those who use students as mock-jurors must assume
that students are representative of the jury population in general, but
of course, students differ in significant ways. At the very least, they
are from a distinct age group; they may have more education than the
general jury population; they are likely to have limited or no work
experience; and their marital status is likely to be single with no de-
pendents. Even in federal court, where the trial judge typically con-
ducts a very limited voir dire,75 the types of questions that are asked
70. Id. at 309-11 (listing the attitudinal variables associated with a verdict preference for the
defendant, including whether jurors thought plaintiffs receive more than they ought to, whether
they favor business, oppose regulation, believe smokers have themselves to blame for smoking-
related illnesses, and believe witnesses tend to give testimony favoring the side that hired them).
71. Id. at 313.
72. Diamond, supra note 11, at 313-14.
73. Id. at 315-16.
74. Id. at 317-18.
75. The federal rules of civil and criminal procedure give federal judges the discretion to de-
cide whether to allow attorneys to conduct the entire voir dire or merely to supplement ques-
tions asked by the court. See FED. R. Civ. P. 47(a); FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a). According to one
survey, based on 420 completed questionnaires, approximately three-fourths of federal district
judges conduct the voir dire without oral participation of the attorneys. See GORDON BERMANT,
CONDUCT OF THE VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION: PRACTICES AND OPINIONS OF FEDERAL DISTRICr
JUDGES 5-20 (1977). The trend is toward judge-conducted voir dire. See John B. Ashby, Juror
Selection and the Sixth Amendment Right to an Impartial Jury, 11 CREiGHTON L. REV. 1137, 1158
(1978). Barbara Babcock has suggested that when judges conduct voir dire they do not do so
with the same thoroughness as attorneys. Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its
Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 546 (1975).
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of prospective jurors (How long have you lived in the jurisdiction?
What kind of work do you do? What is your marital status? What
kind of work does your spouse do? Do you have any children, and if
so, what kind of work do they do? Have you served on a jury before,
and if so, was it criminal or civil, and did it reach a verdict?) 76 are
likely to receive very different answers from students than from a
jury-eligible population. Diamond avoided this methodological weak-
ness, prevalent in many mock-jury studies, by using jury-eligible
citizens.
The second observation is that Diamond avoided another pitfall by
using deliberating juries rather than simply relying on individual ju-
rors in her study of damage awards. Researchers often treat an indi-
vidual's verdict preference or assessment of damages as equivalent to
that reached by a jury,77 but of course when they do so, they fail to
take into account the effects of the deliberation process. A jury ver-
dict or award is not just the sum of the individual preferences. 78 If it
were, there would be no need to have deliberations. The jurors could
simply submit their ballots at the end of the trial, as they do in Bra-
zil. 79 But in this country, jurors are asked to deliberate. One reason is
that we assume that there is a give-and-take that occurs so that jurors
who might have entered the juryroom with one point of view might
leave the juryroom persuaded of the correctness of a contrary point of
view.80
76. See, e.g., United States v. Torres, No. 77 Cr. 680 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1980) (transcript of
jury selection).
77. See, e.g., Michael J. Efran, The Effect of Physical Appearance on the Judgment of Guilt,
Interpersonal Attraction, and Severity of Recommended Punishment in a Simulated Jury Task, 8 J.
RES. PERSONALrrY 45 (1974); Harold Sigall & Nancy Ostrove, Beautiful but Dangerous: Effects
of Offender Attractiveness and Nature of the Crime on Juridic Judgment, 31 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 410 (1975).
78. One writer suggested that such studies should not even be called simulated juror studies:
"It is not clear whether we can even meaningfully speak of simulated jurors without employing a
group deliberation. Investigations of these individual phenomena would be more appropriately
referred to as studies of individual judgment rather than of simulated jurors." Robert D. Foss,
Group Decision Processes in the Simulated Trial Jury, 39 SOCIOMETRY 305, 305 n.1 (1976).
79. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 205 (1994) ("In Brazil, federal juries do not deliber-
ate. At the close of evidence, jurors are individually polled in writing, a secret ballot is taken,
and the majority prevails. Such a procedure stands in stark contrast to our own, where delibera-
tion is the essence of a juror's duty.") (citing HERMAN G. JAMES, THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM
OF BRAZIL 122 (1923)).
80. Jurors could also change their views because they feel pressured to conform. See, e.g.,
SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL 185 (1988)
(describing two possibilities, one in which jurors change their vote because they are persuaded
that another position is correct and the other in which jurors succumb to the majority view
simply because they feel pressured to do so). This undoubtedly occurs, see, e.g., William Finne-
gan, Doubt, NEW YORKER, Jan. 31, 1994, at 48 (offering a personal account of the author's capit-
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Perhaps the best-known example of the transformative power of de-
liberations is the movie 12 Angry Men,81 which depicts a fictional jury
deliberation. Each of the jurors, with the exception of Henry Fonda's
character, entered the juryroom convinced of the defendant's guilt.
After hours of heated debate, sparked by Fonda's questions, doubts,
and arguments, the jury, however, emerged with a unanimous verdict
of not guilty. Although studies have shown that it is difficult, if not
extremely unlikely, for one or two people to change the opinions of
the entire group, as Fonda did, it is possible for three or four people,
or a sizable minority, to produce such a change.82 Diamond, by focus-
ing her study on the result reached by the jury, rather than just the
individual juror, acknowledged the critical role that deliberations play.
Another point acknowledged by Diamond is the difficulty in defin-
ing what is meant by "pain and suffering." It is a nebulous phrase, for
which there is no one understanding. It is precisely in situations such
as this, when there is no right answer, that we turn to the jury to pro-
vide at least an answer. The expectation is that jurors, drawn from a
fair cross section of the community, will be representative of the com-
munity and will engage in a deliberative process through which con-
sensus is reached, and that the judgment arrived at will reflect the
values of the community. 83 What is required of the jury is an interpre-
tation of the phrase "pain and suffering" and how it applies to the
facts of the case. 4 The jurors cannot help but bring their values to the
task. Diamond acknowledged as much when she asked jurors about
attitudes that she thought likely to inform their decisionmaking in her
test products liability case: from current smoking behavior to opinions
ulation to the other jurors, despite his reservations), but it is certainly not the ideal form of
deliberation.
81. 12 ANGRY MEN (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer/United Artists 1957).
82. Despite Henry Fonda's ability to convince 11 other jurors to change their votes in the
movie, see id., "outcomes like this one almost never occur in real life." VALERIE P. HANS &
NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 110 (1986). Research has shown that the "[p]ressures to
conform to the group are strong," and "[i]t is only when a minority juror has initial support, in
the form of other jurors with similar views, that the probability that a juror will sway the major-
ity or hang the jury improves." Id. Otherwise, the lone dissenters typically capitulate, and "[tihe
majority almost always wins." KAssIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 80, at 182; see KALVEN &
ZEISEL, supra note 49, at 488 ("[I]n the instances where there is an initial majority either for
conviction or for acquittal, the jury in roughly nine out of ten cases decides in the direction of the
initial majority. Only with extreme infrequency does the minority succeed in persuading the
majority to change its mind during the deliberation.").
83. See Marder, supra note 54, at 470-74 (describing how the jury should ideally function).
84. Jurors must often engage in interpretation. See Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullify-
ing Jury, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming July 1999). For example, jurors are called upon to
decide whether the government has proven its case "beyond a reasonable doubt" in a criminal
case or whether a defendant has taken "reasonable care" in a negligence case. Id.
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about big business to their views on how much money is required for a
person to be wealthy to how much money it would take to compen-
sate an injured person for various types of injuries.85 She described
these as "internal guideposts" that a juror might use in reaching a de-
termination about pain and suffering awards.86
C. Possible Reforms
1. Increase Jury Size
One reform that Diamond proposed is a return to the twelve-per-
son civil jury. 87 Diamond suggested this change because it would re-
duce variability in jury damage awards. Diamond had noted greater
variability among individual jurors' awards, but reduced variability
among jury awards, particularly for economic damages. 88 By increas-
ing the number of participants on the jury, any idiosyncracies of indi-
vidual jurors would be minimized. 89
Diamond's proposal to increase jury size would help not only to
make jury damage awards more consistent but also to make the jury
more representative of the community. Although this is not a benefit
Diamond explicitly sought, it would be another benefit. If civil juries
consisted of twelve jurors, rather than six or eight, then the chances
that they would include members with different backgrounds, per-
spectives, and life experiences, assuming the venire was broadly
drawn,90 would be increased.
85. Diamond et al., supra note 11, at 309-11.
86. Id. at 305
87. Id. at 317.
88. Id. at 318.
89. Id. ("By pooling contributions from twelve rather than six sources, the larger jury would
be likely to arrive at a more reliable estimate of an appropriate damage award. Whether the jury
is assessing economic or general damages, the effect of pooling should be to reduce the influence
of idiosyncratic estimates.") (footnote omitted).
90. Some commentators have noted that venire lists are often limited to voter registration
lists, and when jurors are drawn from only one type of list, the representativeness of the venire is
compromised. See, e.g., David Kairys et al., Jury Representativeness: A Mandate for Multiple
Source Lists, 65 CAL. L. REV. 776, 803-11 (1977). To overcome this problem, some recommend
supplementing the voter registration list with multiple lists, such as lists of those who have
driver's licenses, pay utilities, or receive welfare benefits or unemployment compensation. See
id. at 826; see also Dennis Bilecki, Program Improves Minority Group Representation on Federal
Juries, 77 JUDICATURE 221, 222 (1994) (recommending the use of driver's license and identifica-
tion card registration records as a supplement to voter registration records to expand jury pools
to include minority groups that have been underrepresented in the past). Other commentators
have recommended "stratefied selection" in which prospective jurors for the venire are sum-
moned proportionally "to obtain a qualified list with racial demographics identical to that of the
population." Nancy J. King & G. Thomas Munsterman, Stratefied Juror Selection: Cross-Section
by Design, 79 JUDICATURE 273, 276 (1996). But see United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1022 (6th
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The debate over the size of the civil jury is hardly new. In the
1970s, academics, judges, and lawyers debated the issue, with courts
taking steps to reduce the size of the civil jury,91 and academics urging
preservation of the twelve-person civil jury.92 Courts were struggling
to save time and money, and reducing jury size allowed them to
achieve both those objectives. Meanwhile, academics were worried
that smaller juries would be less representative of the community at
large and there would be less consistency from verdict to verdict. 93
Although many judges today continue to support the smaller civil ju-
ries, especially now that they have had a fair amount of experience
with them,94 Diamond's research points to why the twelve-person civil
jury still remains the ideal.
2. Provide Guideposts
Diamond's research also led her to take up Peter Schuck's sugges-
tion that courts provide juries with "schedules," 95 or in Diamond's
language, "guideposts" 96 so that they have some guidance as they
struggle to determine damage awards. Diamond is a little vague
about what form these guideposts might take. One possibility is for
courts to give juries a distribution of awards in comparable cases. Of
course, the difficulty is in deciding which cases are comparable. But,
as Diamond pointed out, the task is similar to the one faced by the
drafters of the United States Sentencing Guidelines97 as they tried to
figure out past practices in an effort to determine an appropriate
range of sentences for particular crimes.98 There are other forms the
guidepost could take, from a list of factors that a jury could consider
Cir. 1998) (holding the practice violative of 28 U.S.C. § 1862 and the equal protection compo-
nent of the Fifth Amendment).
91. In civil cases in federal court, the number of jurors is not fixed, but cannot go below six.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 48. In Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149,160 (1973), the court held that a jury
of six members did not violate the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in a civil case.
92. See, e.g., Richard Lempert, Uncovering Nondiscernible Differences: Empirical Research
and the Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REV. 643 (1975); Hans Zeisel,. . . And Then There Were
None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 715-24 (1971); Hans Zeisel &
Shari Diamond, "Convincing Empirical Evidence" on the Six Member Jury, 41 U. CHI. L. REV.
281 (1974).
93. Zeisel, supra note 92, at 715-20.
94. "Improving Jury Selection and Juror Comprehension," Workshop cosponsored by the
Federal Judicial Center and the Institute of Judicial Administration at New York University
School of Law (Dec. 13, 1996).
95. Peter H. Schuck, Mapping the Debate on Jury Reform, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL
JURY SYsTEM 306, 325-26 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
96. Diamond et al., supra note 11, at 318.
97. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1998) [hereinafter SENTENCING GUIDELINES].
98. See Diamond et al., supra note 11, at 320.
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but would not be bound to follow, to the judge's view of an appropri-
ate award. In each instance, the goal would be to give the jury some
indication of a range or ballpark figure.
a. Advantages
Giving the jury some form of guidepost seems quite sensible in
many ways. If jurors had more information about pain and suffering
awards to guide them, in the same way that they have information
about economic losses, then they would find their job as jurors less
frustrating. They would not feel that they were simply inventing a
figure, but rather, that the figure they reached had some foundation.
Providing jurors with the tools they need to do their job, in this case
guideposts with information about awards in comparable injury cases,
is consistent with a modern movement to equip juries properly so that
they can perform their tasks well. For example, some courts are now
giving jurors notebooks and allowing them to take notes during the
trial, on the theory that it helps jurors to pay attention during the trial
and helps them to recall evidence and testimony during delibera-
tions. 99 Courts have also begun to provide jurors with written copies
of the judge's instructions so that they can refer to them in the
juryroom.100 State courts in Arizona have gone even further, allowing
jurors to ask questions by submitting them in writing to the judge dur-
ing the trial. 10 1 Judge Michael Dann, a state court judge in Arizona
who has spearheaded many of these efforts, 10 2 has abandoned the
99. See, e.g., ABABROOKINGS INSTITUTE, CHARTING A FUTURE FOR THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM
18-19 (1992) (recommending notetaking); KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 80, at 128-29
(considering why there is so much resistance to allowing jurors to take notes); David Margolick,
A Call for the Jurors to Take Bigger Roles in Trials, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1993, at A19 (reporting
on notetaking recommendation).
100. See, e.g., ABA/BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, supra note 99, at 24-25.
101. See Laura Mansnerus, Under Fire, Jury System Faces Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1995,
at A9 (summarizing Arizona's reforms which "will permit jurors to take notes, question wit-
nesses through the judge and, in some cases, discuss evidence while a trial is in progress").
102. See THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT COMM. ON MORE EFFECrIVE USE OF JURIES, JU-
RORS: THE POWER OF 12 (1994) (including a list of recommendations and a proposed bill of
rights for jurors); B. Michael Dann & George Logan 11I, Jury Reform: The Arizona Experience,
79 JUDICATURE 280, 280-83 (1994) (describing some of Arizona's more controversial reforms to
its jury system, including giving jurors preliminary jury instructions, allowing them to ask ques-
tions in writing, telling jurors that they can discuss the evidence before the close of trial in a civil
case, giving judges discretion about the timing of instructions, and having the judge and jury
engage in a dialogue if the jury has reached an impasse); William H. Carlile, Arizona Jury Re-
forms Buck Legal Traditions, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 22, 1996, at 1 (reporting that Ari-
zona has adopted 18 of the jury reform panel's 55 recommendations); Junda Woo, Arizona Panel
Suggests Package of Reforms to Empower Juries, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 1994, at B12 (describing
the proposals of a reform panel, headed by Judge B. Michael Dann, which include: allowing
jurors to take notes and ask questions, providing glossaries to jurors, having lawyers do mini-
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traditional Allen charge, 10 3 delivered to a jury that has reached an im-
passe, and has replaced it with a judge-jury conversation in which he
tries to figure out if he or the lawyers can provide the jury with addi-
tional information that will enable it to overcome the impasse. 10 4 Giv-
ing juries guideposts about past damage awards would be consistent
with all of these current efforts to ensure that the jury has the tools it
needs to perform its job properly.
Another advantage to giving juries a guidepost for damage awards
is that it would help them to avoid vastly inconsistent awards. Dia-
mond drew upon the work of Michael Saks and colleagues, 0 5 who
noted that when mock jurors were given information about the distri-
bution of awards in comparable cases, the variability of pain and suf-
fering awards was substantially reduced. Even if jury awards are not
as inconsistent as the press and public might think, any reduction in
inconsistency of jury awards could only be beneficial for the institu-
tion of the jury.
b. Disadvantages
Providing a jury with a guidepost, however, is not without its disad-
vantages, and these would depend, to some extent, on what form the
guidepost took. Any guidepost might signal to jurors a loss of faith in
the jury, or at least a questioning of its capacity to determine damages
on its own. Moreover, a guidepost would wrest some power from the
jury, particularly if jurors felt bound to adhere to it. Even if jurors did
not feel bound by the guidepost, whoever fashions the guidepost
would wield much power. Furthermore, jurors may be influenced by
the guidepost even if they do not rigidly adhere to it.
c. Caveats
Thus, there are several caveats that accompany the design and use
of any guidepost. The first is that whoever is given responsibility for
summations, passing out written summaries of lengthy depositions, urging lawyers and judges to
simplify their language, providing counseling sessions after stressful trials, instructing jurors that
they can discuss the evidence before the end of trial, and increasing the jurors' pay and the
diversity of the venire).
103. If a jury has decided that it has reached a deadlock, then the judge can deliver an "Allen
charge," approved in Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501-02 (1896), which is "a sharp punch
to the jury, reminding [the jurors] of the nature of their duty and the time and expense of a trial,
and urging them to try again to reach a verdict. We specifically have approved the use of such a
charge." United States v. Anderton, 679 F.2d 1199, 1203 (5th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted).
104. See Dann & Logan, supra note 102, at 283.
105. Diamond et al., supra note 11, at 320.
1998]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
compiling the guidepost will have a certain amount of influence. If
this task falls to the judge, then the judge will have added power.
Second, there are lessons to be learned from the Sentencing Guide-
lines experience. 10 6 The guidepost should remain merely a guidepost
and should not become a mandatory schedule to which jurors must
adhere. The Sentencing Guidelines allow federal judges little discre-
tion in terms of sentencing. 10 7 They were implemented largely be-
cause Congress decided that sentences meted out for the same crime
varied too greatly from judge to judge. 10 8 The Sentencing Guidelines
were an effort to bring uniformity to federal sentencing. 10 9 One effect
of the Sentencing Guidelines has been to shift the sentencing discre-
tion that once belonged to the judge, to the prosecutor. 110 The prose-
cutor, in deciding how to charge a defendant, is in effect deciding how
that defendant will be sentenced if he or she is found guilty, now that
the judge no longer has discretion to alter that sentence in any signifi-
cant way. A guidepost that functions as the Sentencing Guidelines
currently do would shift power that now resides with the jury and
would place it in the hands of the judge, or whoever was given respon-
sibility for creating the guidepost.
Third, much care has to be taken with the way any guidepost is
framed. Empirical studies have shown that the same information
106. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 97.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Judicial Sentencing: The Soul of Justice or a Ghost in the
Machine?, TRIAL, Apr. 1996, at 60, 61 ("Of course, Congress intended the commission's guide-
lines to greatly restrict the discretion of sentencing judges, who hitherto exercised vast and prac-
tically unreviewable authority over sentencing."); William W. Wilkins, Jr., The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: Striking an Appropriate Balance, 25 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 571, 571 (1992)
("Prior to the new federal sentencing guidelines, federal judges exercised virtually unreviewable
discretion when sentencing. Too often, Congress decided, this discretion resulted in unwar-
ranted disparities in sentences imposed on similar defendants convicted of similar crimes.").
109. See Dripps, supra note 108, at 61; Wilkins, supra note 108, at 572 (describing Congress as
having the following three goals in passing the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: honesty in sen-
tencing, reasonable uniformity in sentencing, and proportionality in sentencing); Ronald F.
Wright, Complexity and Distrust in Sentencing Guidelines, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 617, 633
(1992) (explaining that "the Commission emphasized the theme of uniform sentences in the
statute"); see also Sheila Balkan, Sentencing Matters, TRIAL, Oct. 1996, at 74 (reviewing
MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS (1996)) ("Based on promises of making sentencing fair
by making punishments proportionate to crime and ending racial and class disparities in sentenc-
ing for similar crimes, imposing a scaled approach to sentencing became the justification for the
current system.").
110. See, e.g., Balkan, supra note 109, at 74 ("Certainly one reason for the disparity [still
present in sentencing] is the power given to prosecutors to influence the sentences of coopera-
tive defendants so they receive more lenient sentences than those under the guidelines. This is a
power not given to judges.").
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worded in different ways can produce different responses from
jurors.111
3. Special Verdicts/Interrogatories
An alternative that Diamond did not consider is the special verdict
or the general verdict and interrogatories. These are procedural de-
vices that are already available in federal 12 and state1 13 courts and
provide a means by which trial judges can give some structure to a
jury's reasoning process. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the trial judge can submit written questions to the jury and the jury
returns a special verdict in the form of written findings of fact.114 Or,
the judge can have the jury return a general verdict, but answer inter-
rogatories that have been posed to it by the judge. 115 With either
method, the judge is outlining the way the jury should approach the
issue, step by step. Although these methods are typically used to as-
sist the jury in rendering a verdict, they could also be used for a dam-
age award.
This alternative is not without its drawbacks. Many of the criticisms
that can be made about guideposts are equally applicable to these pro-
cedural mechanisms. Once again, the power of the jury is being some-
what redistributed to the judge. The judge designs the questions that
are to be answered by the jury, and thus, the judge plays a more intru-
sive role in structuring the jury's deliberations, a task that is typically
left in the jury's hands. Academics are likely to be wary of this reform
because it enhances the judge's power. Judges are likely to resist be-
cause they worry about intruding on the jury's deliberations. Attor-
neys are likely to object because they remain ever hopeful that their
client will receive the wildcard damage award, which is less apt to oc-
cur if the judge is involved in shaping the jury's determination.
111. See Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and
Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341 (1995).
112. See FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a) (Special Verdicts) and 49(b) (General Verdict Accompanied by
Answer to Interrogatories).
113. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-224(a) (West 1997) ("In a special verdict the jury
shall find the facts .... ); MD. R. Civ. P. 2-522(c) (Michie 1998) ("The court may require a jury
to return a special verdict in the form of written findings upon specific issues."); N.Y. C.P.L.R.
4111(b) (Consol. 1997) ("When the court requires a jury to return a special verdict, the court
shall submit to the jury written questions susceptible of brief answer or written forms of the
several findings which might properly be made .... ); id. at 4111(c) ("When the court requires
the jury to return a general verdict, it may also require written answers to written interrogatories
submitted to the jury upon one or more issues of fact.").
114. See FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a) (Special Verdicts).




With the recommendations Diamond suggested, there is no need to
choose one over the other; they are not mutually exclusive. Jury size
could be increased and a guidepost could be provided. If a guidepost
is unsuitable in a particular case, then the alternative of using the spe-
cial verdict or the general verdict plus interrogatories may be appro-
priate. In the case of guideposts or special verdicts/interrogatories,
care must be taken that the jury still retains its discretion and that
neither approach becomes rigid and binding. Both methods must be
viewed with caution because in either case the drafter, who is likely to
be the judge, will have increased power to shape and influence the
damage award.
CONCLUSION
Both Neil Vidmar's and Shari Diamond's empirical studies of dam-
age awards provide useful insights about jury behavior. Vidmar's re-
search establishes that juries' pain and suffering awards are consistent
and that they are not as munificent as they seem in press accounts
once post-verdict adjustments have been made by judges. Diamond's
work shows that while there is greater volatility in pain and suffering
awards than in liability verdicts, there is less volatility when juries'
awards are compared to individual jurors' awards. Both studies pro-
vide useful rejoinders to members of the press and public who would
characterize jury verdicts as "outrageous" and who would describe ju-
ries as "runaway."
Vidmar and Diamond do not claim to know what is the "right"
amount for pain and suffering awards. At most, they look to variation
and consistency in jury awards and make careful comparisons between
judge and jury awards, avoiding the trap of using a judge's assessment
as a benchmark for what is a "correct" damage award. 116 As Vidmar
and Diamond have acknowledged, there is no right answer when it
comes to damage awards, which is precisely why we rely on juries to
make these determinations in the first place.
116. Although Kalven and Zeisel anticipate some of the objections that may be raised to using
a judge's assessment of a case as a benchmark for evaluating a jury's assessment, see KALVEN &
ZEISEL, supra note 49, at 50-52, they also offer reasons for relying on judges' assessments, see id.
at 94-95, which is the approach they ultimately choose to take.
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